A Prehistory of ProbabilityTheory by Graves, Thomas S. et al.
A PREJITSTORY OF PROBABILITY THEORY 
Thomas S. Graves 
Biometrics Unit, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853 
BU-578-M February 1976 
Abstract 
This paper is an attempt to deal with the development of the theory of 
probability from the beginning of recorded history until its official discovery 
in 1654 by Pascal and Fermat. I will attempt to ana.lyze the actions of some of 
the figures associated with the development and attempt to dra~T inferences as 
to ~Thy certain events happened or didn't happen at specified time intervals. 
I will also look·i at some of the qualities that these men possessed that enabled 
these events to take place. The major conclusion is that basic probability 
theory came about as the merging of the idea of random phenomena (exemplified 
by gambling) with the exact science of mathematics. This apparent contradiction 
in terms is the reason why probability theory was so long in developing, and 
why it ultimately took men of great genius to master it. 
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Introduction 
This paper is an attempt to deal with the development of the theory of 
probability from the beginning of recorded history up until its official dis-
covery in 1654 by Pascal and Fermat. I will attempt to analyze the actions of 
some of the figures associated with the development and attempt to draw infer-
ences as to why certain events happened or didn't happen at specified time 
intervals. I will also look at some of the qualities that these men possessed 
that enabled these events to take place. 
~robability in A~tiquity 
The playing of games of chance seems to be as old as civilization itself. 
Large number of heel bones of deer or sheep, called astragali or tali, and 
knucklebones have been found in many ancient civilizations, including those of 
Egypt, Babylon, Greece and Rome. There are many references in history to the 
use of these bones in game playing. F. N. David tells us that there are records 
of painting on Grecian urns of children playing with bones, much like marbles, 
and that according to Homer, Patrocles played with knucklebones as a child.1 
Cardano also tells us of another account in Homer of Palamedis, a Greek, in-
venting some games of chance in order to relieve the tedium during the ten-year 
siege of Troy.2 David mentions an account of He~odotus, the Greek historian, 
writing on the famine at Lydia. Herodotus "YII"i tes that the Lydians took up the 
playing of games of chance with great vigor so that they could forget about 
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eating on every other 'day and last out the· food shortage. Among the games he 
mentions are dice, knucklebones .and .backgammon. 3 
One of the typical games of this time was played 1rith four astragali. Each 
of the four sides of each astragali was numbered 1, 3, 4 or 6. The one was 
called the "dog" by the Romans, and the most highly valued throw was called the 
Venus, occurring when each of the bones showed a different face. One wonders 
why this was the best, since under today' s ru:les in games of chance~ the best 
is the least probable. 
The earliest dice were thought to have been made in the third millenium 
B.C. and have been found in both Tepe Gaivra in Northern Iraq and Mohenjo-Daro 
in India. 4 It is interesting to note that these fired pottery die were marked 
with pips, like our own. 
Since the use of dice and astragali was so common in antiquity, particularly e 
in ancient Greece, one wonders why the .Greeks, for all of their other great sci-
entific achievements, never came up with any sort of probability theory. Sam-
bursky tells us that the concept of events being probable as opposed to being 
certain seemed to bother many of the great thinkers of ancient Greece. 6 The 
Greek equivalent of probable-elkos-meaning "to be expected with some degree 
of certainty"6 was in use in Greek literature from the time of the pre-socratics 
through the Hellenistic period. In Plato's Phaedra, Socrates says that in courts 
of law, men "care nothing about truth, but only about conviction, and this is 
based on probability. "7 Sambursky gives us another good illustration of this: 
The awareness of the fact that empirical truth does not rest on 
the same safe foundations as does mathematical truth independent of 
the time factor, led to the coining of a very striking term for the 
natural sciences. Simplicius tells us: "Aptly did Plato call natural 
science the science of the probable; Aristotle was of the same opinion 
and postulated that exact evidence nrust spring from immediate and 
reliable principles and from exact and essentially primary causes. 8 
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This characterization of the natural sciences as being based largely on 
the unpredictable again makes one wonder vrhy the ancient Greeks never really 
developed a theory of probability as such. Certain ideas which are very much 
in harmony with it were expounded by the Stoics. These ideas are given by 
Sambursky: 
A definition of the Possible ~dely accepted in the post-
Aristotelian era and down to the late Hellenistic period >vas that of 
Diodorus the Megarian who said: ''The ·Possible is that ·vrhich either 
is or ~11 be true"[*]. This identification of the Possible with 
actual or potential happenings was challenged by the Stoics, who de-
fined the Possible as 11 that which is not prevented by anything from 
happening even if it does not happen" [ t]. At the same time the 
Stoics maintained that the Possible is part and parcel of "things 
happening according to fate", and they regarded the Possible as an 
integral part of the causal set-up of the vrorld. According to the 
meager information available on the subject, mainly Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, de fato, the Stoics argued as follows: Let us suppose 
that there aretWci'lnutually exclusive possibilities, A and B; then 
the non-realization of A means the realization of B. The same causal 
nexus, therefore, which led to the happening of B was the reason which 
prevented A from happening, and both A and B have their place in the 
causal scheme. The very fact, hmrever, that A could be assumed as 
possible, although it did not happen, is attributed to our ignorance 
of the future, i.e. of the complete causal nexus. It is this ignor-
ance which gives meaning to the category of the Possible and which 
for a consistent determinist is the prerequisite of the existence of 
"equally possible cases", of which one alone is going to take place. 
* Pl~t., de Stoic. repugn., 1055E. 
t Plut., :!_. S· and Alex. Aphr., de Fa to, ch. 10. 
This idea of ''equally probable cases", one of -vrhich must take place> puts 
one right into the h~art of modern probability theory. All one would need to do 
is count up the number of 1vays each of the cases could occur and divide by the 
total overall to get the probabi.li ty of occurrence. Certainly gatnes of chance 
vrere popular enough at this time to give some impetus to such an idea, so 1vhy 
didn't it happen? Of course one can only speculate but one reason may be that 
for the most part the dice of this time, and certainly the astragali, were so 
asymmetrical as to give extremely inconsistent results from one set to awther, 
so much so that it may never have occurred to anyone that certain faces come 
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up a certain proportion of the time. A second reason is that, with the Greek 
number system, the calculations would have been intractable. An example of 
1-1here the above reasoning may hold is that the Venus throw was considered the 
best with four astragali, when four ·of a kind is certainly harder to make, i.e. 
a Venus can be made in 4! = 24 different ways and four of a kind in only 4 ways. 
A third reason is the superstition of gamblers, which still holds today, '1hen 
the theory of probability is widely known. ·If the average gambler really didn't 
believe that there were outside forces which affected the dice, call it luck, 
the gods or vrhatever, he would hardly have any reason to play, since in a fair 
game his expected 't'rlnnings are zero. Of course, gambling skill, such as knowing 
how much to bet at certain times, can make a difference, but the wide assortment 
of lucky charms used by gamblers today is something at which a re.tior.al man can 
only marvel. 
A fourth .reason,-whidr Sambursky gives us, is a philosophical one. Aris-
totle 's and Plato '·s idea of ·perfection in the heavens and imperfection in the 
--.·· -,, 
.-., 
sublunar region gives us a reason why probability theory nevery really caught 
on. Recurrent, perfect motion exists only in the outer heavens. Recurrent 
phenomena may also exist in the lower world, but it is due only to a direct 
affect from the heavens, such as day and night or the change of seasons. 
The idea of man producing regular sequences of anything goes against this prin-
ciple and following from this, the idea of la't'TS governing as chaotic an event 
as the throws of a die, i.e. that certain faces turn up a regular proportion 
of the time, is absurd.10 
A fifth reason> which vrlll show itself to be most important when we actu-
ally get to the actual discoveries of probability theory, is that the Greek 
intellectuals and scientists themselves seem to have had very little amicable 
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contact with gambling and gamblers, as Cardano hints at in his chapter entitled 
"Why Gambling Was Condemned by Aristotle. ; As we will see, it will ta.ke a com-
bination of gamblers' intuition and intellectual thought to actually come up 
with the theory of probability. In order for a great thii:lker to ·ma.ke use of 
his abilities, he will have to actually "get his hands dirty" with the real data 
to get an idea of what is truly going on. 
Probability in the Middle Ages 
As vdth most other sciences in the Middle Ages, probability made almost no 
progress in Europe. We also know of very little progress in the Arab world, 
aside fro'll the great improvements in mathematics 1vhich vrould help in development 
at a much later time. One of these indirect accomplishments vras the discovery 
of binomial coefficients by Omar Khayyam (died 1214 )) a Persian. 
With the coming to power of the Christian Church, the idea of a random 
event could not exist, as God was responsible for absolutely everying, even 
--r ,~. 
the throw of your die. Dark Ages man, hm'lever, was quick to take advantage of 
this and the practice of casting die to determine God's will became very popular. 
All one needed to do was to tell God how you would interpret each thro>-T, i.e. 
say a pray~r or do a good deed and throw the dice. He, of course, would control 
the result and in doing so would tell you what to do. I am surprised that this 
"heavenly hotline" didn't become more popular than it did. 
The idea of randomness to discover God's will was not nevr even at this time. 
The drmving of lots to determine important information is prevalent throughout 
the Bible and is still in use today. The game of odds and evens, played by two 
people holding out one or two fingers simultaneously, has also been used for 
. i 
thousands of years including the present day. The religious Greeks used five 
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astragali thro"tm simultaneously to pred.i~t fortunes. David gives us .. an example 
from Frazier of tables of these: 
1.3.3.4.4. = 15. The throw of Saviour Zeus. 
One one, two threes, two fours,----
The deed which thou meditatest, go do it boldly. 
Put thy hand to it. The gods have given these favourable omens. 
Shrink not from it in thy mind, for no evil shall befall thee. 
6.3.3.3.3. = 18. The throw of Good CronoE_. 
A six and four threes. 
Haste notJ for a divinity opposes. Bide thy time. 
Not like a bitch that has brought forth a litter of blind puppies. 
Lay thy plans quietly, and they sl';lall be brought to a fair completion. 
6.4.4.4.4. = 22. The thrm-r of Poseidon. 
One six and all the rest are fours. 
To throw a· s·eed into the sea and to 't'Tri te letters, 
Both these things are empty toil and a mean act. 
Mortal as thou art, do no violence to a god, who wi.l.l injure thee. 
4.4.4.6.6. = 24. .The throw of child-eating Cronos. 
Three fours and two sixes. God speaks as fo.llmrs: 
Abide in thy .;house, nor go e.lse"t-There,. 
Lest a ravening and destroying beast come nigh thee. 
For I see nqt ,that this busines? is safe. But bide thy time.ll 
There are many more examples of this sort of thing throughout antiquity and up e 
to the present day, including the modern practice of divination "t'ri.. th playing cards. 
: ~ ... 
From this use of dice .throwing for divinatiC?P,-, we come across one of the 
earliest enumerations of the thrQ\<rS of dice. In aboui:; 960 A. D. a Bishop Wiebold 
of Cambray incorpor~ted a device to let God decide wha~ prayers his monks should 
say. Wiebold enumerated the 56 possible outcomes of the three die, irrespective 
.of qrder, and set to each a virtue. The monks would roll the dice each day and 
see which virtue God "\'ranted them to practice. 
Not all of the dicing at this time was for holy purposes. There are many 
records of church edicts forbidding gambling. Kendall gives us one from Louis 
IX in 1255: "'l'hey shall abstain from dice and chess, from fornication and fre-
quenting taverns. Gaming houses and ·manufacture of dice are prohibited through-
out tb.e realm. 1112 Hovrever, it appears that the church wasn't really against 
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dice as such, but against the evil behavior that \'Tent with them .. Kendall gives 
us this example of a gambler, s b.1asphemy from Chaucer 1 s 11The Pardoner 1 s Tale 11 : 
By Geddes precious heart and by his nails 
And by the b.lood of Christ that is in Hayles 
Seven is my chance, and thine is cinq_ and trey. 
By Geddes armes, if thou falsely play 
This dagger shall throughout thine herte go!--
This fruit cometh of the bitched bones two: 
Fors\'1earing, ire, falseness, homicide.13 
The first kno\'m work dealing with the counting of the number of ways in 
'\llhich three dice can fall, including permutations, is found in a Latin poem called 
De Vetula, "'vhich deals with sports and games. It has been attributed to several 
authors, but the general consensus is that it was written by one Richard de Four-
neval (1200-1250), the chancellor of the Cathedral of Amiens. Kendall gives the 
relevant passage: 
If all three numbers are alike there are six possibilities; if 
two are alike and the other different there are 30 cases, because the 
pair can be chosen in six ways and the other in five; and if all three 
are different there are 20 ways, because 30 times 4 is 120 but each 
possibility arises in 6 ways. There are 56 possibilities. 
But if all three are alike there is only one way for each number; 
if ti'ro are alike and one different there are three ways; and if all 
are different there are six '\~lays. The accompanying figure shows the 
various ways. 
It follovts, but is not stated, that the total number of ways is 
(6 X 1) + (30 X 3) + (20 X 6) = 216.14 
Thus we have a start for the probability of dice. 
The first known attempt at solving a probability problem is that of Fra 
Luca de Borga, also called Paccio.li. In his book Surmna ?J. A~i thmetica, Geometri~ 
Proportioni et Proportionalita (1494) he considers a problem which later became 
known as the problem of points and inspired Fermat and Pascal. In this problem 
>ve have two gamblers> A and B, who make a bet and agree that the winner will be 
the first to take six rounds of some game, but have to quit when A has vTOn five 
and B three. Ho't'r should they divide the stakes? The correct answer is that A 
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shou.ld get seven parts and B one, .. since the game "t-Tould end in at most three more 
rounds, with ~ = 8 possible. outcomes, .. 7 ef these favoring A. Paccioli decides 
A should get five, B three. Approximately sixty years later, another famous 
mathematician of the time, Tartaglia in his General Trattalo published in 1556 
decides that this is wrong, baseQon the reasoning that if A has one game, B 
none, then A 1'TOU1d take the entire stakes, which would not be fair. He decides 
instead that if A has won X, B has won Y, where X + Y = z. X > Y, then the for-
. X-Y) mula should be that A gets (t + 2Z , B getting the rest.16 
Two years later, G. F. Peverone in his work Breve ~ Fa~ili Trattali, il 
Primo d 1Ari thmetica, l 1Altra di Geometria, considers a similar problem, 1ri thout 
reference to his predecessors, and almost gets the correct answer. In his ex-
ample, A has taken seven games, B has nine games, with ten needed to win. Kendall 
gives his argument: 
A should put 2 crowns and B 12 crowns [or, eq_uivalently, the stake 
should be divided in the.proportion 1:6]. For if A, like B, had one game 
to go each 't'TOUld put two crowns [or diVide the stakes in equal propor-
tions].· If A had tvro games to go against B 1 s one, he should put 6 
crmms against· B 1 s ·two, because, by wirining two games he would have 
1mn four crowris, but with ·the risk of losing the second after winning 
the first; and with three games to go he should put 12 crowns because 
the difficulty and. risk are doubled.l 6 
Kendall calls this one of the near misses of mathematics. The arguments for the 
first and second games are correct. If B has one game to go and is betting two 
crovms, then for A: 
With one game to go he stakes 2 crmms. \'lith two games to go he 
stakes 2 + 4 crmms. With three games to go he stakes 2 + 4 + 8 
cro-vms.17 
Had Peverone been consistent and followed his own rules, he would have solved 
the problem. 
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. Gero.lamo Cardano ( 1501-1576) 
vTe now come to the original pioneer in the theory of probability, Gerolamo 
Cardano. His treatise, the Liber de Ludo Aldae (The Book on Games of Chance)18 
is really the first text of any sort on probability theory. The fact that it 
has been maligned by many scholars up to the present day, including David and 
Todhunter, seems to be because of the wretched style of the-book (which Goulds 
seems to have miraculously cleared up in his translation) and its inconsistencies, 
which I think only add to the educational value of the text. It was never pub-
lished by Cardano and only appeared in 1663 in a ten-volume set of CA.rdano's 
works, 138 years after 1525, when Cardano claims to have written ·it. The princi-
pal inconsistency involved Cnrdano 's derivation of the so-called ''power law" of 
probability, an example of which is: if the probability of flipping a coin and 
getting a head on one toss is ~' then the probability of flipping the coin n times 
and getting n heads is (})n. Cardano states this relationship incorrectly several 
times before getting it right, which he ultimately does. However, his attempts 
to derive this law, although not mathematically very elegant, greatly enhance 
the insight one gets tnto understanding just what it took to initiate the theory 
of probability. 
Cardano was born in Milan, Italy, on September 24, 1501. His father was a 
well-known lawyer and intellectual, and personal friend of Leonardo da Vinci. 
HovTever, his mother and father did not marry until -many years later, a fact which 
was to plague Cardano for nruch of his later life. He attended medical schools 
in Pavia and Padua, where his remarkable intelligence made him mAny friends and 
enemies. He uas soon elected to the rectorship of the university, a post appar-
ently equivalent to today's· president of the student body. As the rector he w·as 
expected to do a lot of entertaining and, as he v1asn 1t wealthy, he started to 
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gamble to support himself, implying tl::l:fl.t he must ha.ve been quite good. Upon 
graduation, he applied for a position in the College of Physicians at Milan but 
was officially turned down owing to his bastard status. Because of this, he 
spent many lean years in poor towns as town physician and always needed to gamble 
to support himself and his family. Finally, due to his proficiency as a physi-
cian and his father's influential friends, he was appointed to the College of 
•' 
Physicians and also to a position as a public lecturer, a job which v1on him 
great acclaim. It was at this time that he began publishing books on a wide 
variety of subjects, inspired by his lectures. He was especially noted for his 
works on mathematics which were widely read. He was also acclaimed one of the 
greatest physicians of his time, and turned down appointments as court physician 
to crowned heads all over Europe. H~1ever, his good fortune didn't last, and 
after several family tragedies, he v1as arrested for heresy. Due to his age at 
the time (70) and his previous good behavior, he was allowed to live at home and 
died there at the age of 76. 
Cardano 1 s _!)ook .£!! Games of Ch~ ... was apparently written as a gamblers 1 
.. manual, and could very well haye been called "The Compleat Gambler. 11 Along with 
probability theory, he also includes such topics as how to recognize cheaters, 
the psychology of gambling and gamblers, why Aristotle condemned gambling, some 
history of games of chance and, of course, since he was a physician first and 
foremost, the therapeutic value of gambling. In his discussions on probability 
theory, he writes of equiprobability, mathematical expectation, frequency tables 
for the enumeration of casts of dice in several different games, on the additive 
property of probabilities, and on the power law of probabilities. He even seems 
to possess a vague understanding of the laws of large numbers. In his chapters 
on the casting of one, two, or three dice, he calculates the proportion of 
favorable cases to the proportion of unfavorable cases for certain throws, just 
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as it is done today. F9r t"t>ro _dice, he states: 
The number of thr.q~s containing at least one ace is eleven out 
of the circuit of thirty-six; or somewhat more than half of equality; 
and in two casts of two dice the number of ways of getting at least 
one ace twice is more than 1/6 but less than 1/4 of equality.19 
When he says "the circuit" he means the number of ways that the dice can fall, 
and "equality" is one-half the circuit. Qre implies that the reason for the term 
equality is because, in a two-man game, each would have a probability of winning 
equal to i, so the expected number of winning cases would be i( circuit) =equality, 
which would therefore be each player's possible number of favorable occurrences. 
He then goes on to say: 
In three casts of two dice the number of times that at least one 
ace will turn up three times in a row falls far short of the whole 
circuit, but its turning up twice differs from equality by about 1/12. 
The argument is based upon the fact that such a succession is in con-
formity with a series of trials and would be inaccurate apart from 
such a series • .ao 
This is what Ore calls "reasoning on the mean. rtal It is based on the fact that 
the probability of making a 6 with one die on one toss is 1/6, on two throws is 
2/6, and so on until we get to the probability of a 6 on 6 throws to be one. His 
error here is in confusing the probability with the expected value of the toss, 
something still common today in basic probability classes. Cardano realizes 
that this doesn't always happen in a small number of tosses but on the whole 
bears itself out, thus demonstrating an understanding of the law of large numbers. 
He makes what is today known as a large sample approximation. 
Moreover, a repeated succession, such as favorable points occurring 
twice, arises from circuits performed in turn; for example, in 3,600 
casts, the equality is i of that number, namely, 1,800 casts; for in 
such a number of casts the desired result may or may not happen with 
equal probability. So the whole set of circuits is not inaccurate, 
except insofar as there can be repetition, even t't>Tice or three times, 
in one of them. Accordingly, this knowledge is based on conjecture 
which yields only an approximation, and the reckoning is not exact in 
these details; yet it happens in the case of many circuits that the 
matter falls out very close to conjecture.32 
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In the next fe't-7 chapters, he correctly enumerates the number of ways of making 
certain points w1 th dice in severa.i different games. 
In his Chapter 14, he gives a general rule for gambling, since 11 mathemati-
cians ·may be deceived. " He states: 
I have wishes this matter not to lie hidden because many people, 
not understanding Aristotle, have been deceived, and with loss. So 
there is one general rule, namely, that we should consider the whole 
circuit, and the number of those. casts which represents in how many 
ways the favorable result can occur, and compare that number to the 
remainder of the circuit, and according to that proportion should the 
mutual wagers be laid so that one may contend on equal terms.2 3 
This is exactly the concept of a fair game and represents a hitherto unkna't'm ab-
straction from empirical observation to theoretical concept. But he then uses 
this rule incorrectly to derive the power law, coming closer but not quite get-
ting it. He again brings up the problem of throwing an ace twice, once on each 
of two tosses of three die. The actual probability of one ace is 21_~, two aces 
( 91)2 is 216 • Cardano realizes that it is a power rule but trips over his own 
notation. He states: 
But if two casts are necessary, we shall multiply them in turn, 
and the remainders for those numbers' in turn, and if three are neces-
sary, or four, we shall do the same, and then we shall have to make 
the comparison in accordance with the numbers thus obtained. Thus, 
if it is necessary for someone that he should throw an ace twice, then 
you kno't-7 that the throws favorable for it are 91 in number, and the 
remainder .is 125; so we multiply each of these numbers by itself and 
get 8, 281 and 15,625, and the odds are about 2 to 1. 'lb.us, if he 
should wager double, he will contend under an unfair condition, al-
though in the opinion of some the condition of the one offering 
double stakes would be better. In three successive casts, therefore, 
if an ace is necessary, the odds will be 753,57.1 to .1, 953,125, or 
very nearly 5 to 2, but somewhat greater. 3 4. 
In Chapter 15 he again decides that this can't be true by working through some 
simple examples, so he again sets out to find the proper formula. Using the 
example of an even or odd roll, he correctly gets the formula for an even roll 
2 . 2 
on two tries to be (~) , but errs again when he generalizes this to (~) for an 
even roll on n tries. He works through some more simple examples and again 
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realizes he has come up with the wrong answer. So nmr he goes to the case of a 
four-sided talus with three odd faces and orie even, so the probability of getting 
ddf t . .§. an o ace on one ass J..S 4 • Using this example, he finally comes up vnth the 
correct rule, i.e. if p is the probability of making a certain point on 1 toss, 
then(p)n is the probability of making it n times in n tosses. He works through 
a few more examples and ultimately convinces himself that his is right. 
In reading through these passages, we begin to realize exactly what combin-
ation of circumstances it took for Cardano to develop the theory of probabi.lity. 
First of all, Cardano was a physician, trained in the observational methods of 
Galen and Hippocrates. Secondly, he was a mathematician, well versed in all of 
the latest methods, and last of all, he was a gambler. The claim is that all 
three of these sides of Cardano contributed to his ability to do what he did. 
As a mathematician, he was able to make conjectures about the laws of probabil-
ity, as had Tartaglia and Paccioli before him. But as a physician he was trained 
in the method of actually taking careful observation of the hypothesized solu-
tions to his medical problems, i.e. so he could reformulate if his patient got 
worse, and this put him in the frame of mind where he would check his mathe-
matical solutions, unlike his predecessors, against actual obse:rVation. And 
fir~y, his gambling experience gave him the intuitive feel for the observations 
that he needed to tie all of this together. Cardano' s methods also remind one 
a bit of those of Archimedes, in the famous letter in which Archimedes explains 
how he came up with the formulas for the centers of mass of certain plane fig-
ures by first cutting them out of sheepskin and balancing them on a point to 
see v7here the center was, and then finding a formula to fit his observation. 
Perhaps if he had included this in his works, as Cardano had, he also would have 
been maligned by modern mathematicians as being "inelegant," one of the most 
insulting terms used in present day mathematical literature. 
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As :for the philosophical questions of· ·random phenomena, Cardano seems to 
:feel that :for the most part, '\vhat appears· to one man to be luck is usually skill-
ful gambling, i.e. betting high on good cards and low on bad, intelligent handling 
of circumstances, or to cheating, i.e~ playing with marked cards. The final 
passage from his chapter on luck gives a good illustration of' how he feels on 
the subject: 
Now I think it worthy of consideration that this fortune of' mine 
seems to have been something greater than mere chance, since we see in 
it a beginning, an increase, and a certain continuance so that certain 
remarkable things happen, as for .. instance that two aces occurred twice 
when defeat could not otherwise be brought about, and other things of 
this sort. We would also see ·-a decline and then very often a change, 
and then great calamity or great good fortune, and other things in 
the same way. In view of all this I should think we ought to decide 
that there is something in this, although we do not know the law which 
connects the parts. It is· as th0Ugh you were fated in advance to be 
enriched or despoiled; especially seeing that from this there can 
follow something more important,· ·as it happened to the man who, on 
leaving a game after losing all his money, injured the image of the 
Blessed Virgin with his :fist. He was arre·sted and condemned to be 
hanged. 
But whether the cause of that luck, be it in the conjunction of' 
the stars or in the const~ction of' a certain order of' the universe, 
can affect the cards, ·which are considered ··bad or good only according 
to the conventions of men (since they signify nothing of themselves), 
is so worthy of' doubt that it is easier to find. a cause of this fact 
without that.purpose than with it; without it the matter can well be 
reduced to chance, as in the constitution of the clouds, the scatter-
ing of beans, and the like.2 6 
It is hard to say how much effect philosophy had on his calculations but one 
can probably say that without a visceral belief in some sort of laws of recur-
rent phenomena, he would have had no reason to worry about probability theory. 
The next person to publish any results on probability theory was Gali.leo. 
He wrote a short treatise Guiocco Dei Dadi (loosely: Thoughts on Dice Games2 6 ), 
which consists merely of a table of' the enumeration of the possible tosses of 
three dice, and a short passage on how he derived these results. David informs 
us that it was written at the bidding of Galilee's benefactor, the Duke of Tus-
cany, and apparently for no other reason, certainly not his own interest in the 
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problem. He states: 
Now I, to oblige him who has ordered me to produce whatever occurs 
to me about such a problem, will expound my ideas,27 
This passage is included only because historically it is recognized as a big step, 
since Cardano's work wasn't really appreciated until Ore's book in 1953. 
We now come to what is officially considered to be the birth of probability 
theory. Our story begins in 1654, when Antoince Gombaud Chevalier de Mere came 
to his friend Blaise Pascal with two gambling problems. In many texts, de Mere 
is listed as a gambler, but Ore tells us that he was in fact a gentleman who 
dabbled slightly in mathematics and was confused about the solution to the prob-
lem of p0ints stated and unsolved in many textbooks of the time. He actually 
shared Pascal's disdain of professional gamblers, but together they did do some 
friendly gambling. Blaise Pascal was born in Clermont-Ferrand, France, in 1623. 
His father, like Cardano's, was also a well-known jurist and intellect. As a 
child, Pascal was reported to have been of wondrous intelligence, but poor 
health. His life was torn between his great scientific achievements in physics 
and mathematics and his fervent devotion to Jansenism, an anti-science sect of 
Christianity, which ultimately won out in his later years. 
De Mere proposed two problems to Pascal, the first concerning how many times 
one must be allowed to toss two dice in order to have a better than even chance 
of obtaining t·vm sixes at least once, and another which \'."aS a version of 
the problem of points. 
The proper solution to the first problem is found by the following method. 
Let pn = p[ one gets at least one double six in n tosses} = .1 - ( q)n, where q = ~· 
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Solving, we get: 
1 35)n 2 :;: 1 ., (36 
~ = (i)n 
log (~) = n log (~) 
n =-.24.605 
Therefore, for p ~ ~' we want n ~ 25. 
n 
, ., 
This ans1o1er apparently upset de Mere, as Pascal '\>Trites to Fermat: 
He told me that he had found a fallacy in the theory of numbers, 
for this reason: 
If one undertakes to get a six with one die, the advantage in 
getting it in 4 throws is as 671 is to 625. 
If one undertakes to throw 2 sixes with t""ro dice, there is a dis-
advantage in undertaking it in 24 throws. _ 
And nevertheless 24 is to 36 (which is the number of pairings of 
the faces of two dice) as 4 is to 6 (which is the number of faces of 
one die). 
This is what made him so indignant and which made him say to one 
and all that the propositions were not consistent and that Arithmetic 
was self-contradictory: but you 1dll very easily see,that what I say 
is correct, understanding the principles as you do.ae 
In the second problem, Pascal gives de Mere an almost correct answer, but 
another well-known mathematician, Roberval, hears of the solution and ridicules 
it, obviously because he didn't understand it. So apparently because he is still 
a little unsure of himself, he writes to his father's old friend, Pierre de Fermat, 
the man considered to be the greatest mathematician in France. 
Fermat was born in ~eaumont-de-Lomagne near Gascony in 1601. He was the 
son of a merchant. He studied law at the University of Toulouse and finished in 
1631. He 1r1as extremely well-read and famous in his time, and several theorems 
in a.lgebra bear his name and are still studied today. 
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The first letter from Pascal to Fermat has been lost, but we have Fermat's 
reply. In it, he reviews Pascal's solution to the problem of points a.nd finds 
him correct on all but one facet, '\'Thich he then corrects. The problem concerns 
a game in which eight attempts are made to make a six with a single ~e, and the 
way the stakes should be divided in the event that the game is halted at certain 
stages of play vli th the point not having been made. 
should get~ of the pot if he doesn't take his first 
They agree that the thrmrer 
1 throw, b of the remaining 
t if he doesn't take his second, and so on. This is because his expected win-
n i-1 
nings are p{winning} · pot = ~ pot. This generalizes to i~l (~)(t) portion of 
the pot for n throws not taken. Pascal then trips over his notation, and says 
that if he takes three throws and not his fourth, he should get (g)(t)3 for the 
fourth thr01-r, but Fermat corrects him, explaining that the expected value of a 
throw does not depend on previous throws, i.e. the fourth throw is still the 
1 first not taken, so its value is b of the pot. 
Pascal's reply to Fermat is joyous in tone, with Pascal in complete agree-
·ment with Fermat. He then proposes another problem to Fermat and presents his 
solution for Fermat to check. The problem again involves stopping before certain 
points are made. He considers three cases in a game in which the first to make 
3 vrins. In the first case, he vrri tes: 
Here, more or less, is vrhat I do to shmv the fair value of each 
game, when two opponents play, for example, in three games, and each 
person has staked 32 pistoles. 
Let us say that the first man had won twice and the other once; 
now they play another game, in which the conditions are that, if the 
first wins, he takes all the stakes, that is.i54 p;isto.les, if the other 
wins it, then they have each won t"toTO games, and therefore, if they wish 
to stop playing, they must each take back their O"tom stake, that is, 
32 pistoles each. 
Then consider, Sir, if the first man wins, he gets 64 pistoles, 
if he loses he gets 32. Thus if they do not wisp.to risk this last 
game, but wish to separate vrlthout playing it, the first man must 
say: "I am certain to get 32 pistoles, even if I lose I still get 
them; but as for the other 32, perhaps I will get them, perhaps you 
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will get them,. the chances are equal., L~t us tben divide these 32 
pistoles in half and give one half to me as well as rrry 32 which are 
mine for sure." He will then have 48 pistoles and the other 16.29 
From here he goes to the case where A has two, B has none. In the next game, a 
win for A gives him the total, a win f.or B puts them back in case one, so A gets 
the average of the two, i.e. ~(64 + 48) = 32 + 24 = 56. The third case is A hav-
ing one, B zero. A win for A puts them in case two, a win for B evens them, so 
A gets it( 56+ 32) = 44 = 32 + 12. Pascal then.generalizes: 
Now, in this way, you see, by s~mple subtraction, that for the 
first game, 12 pistoles of the other man's money are due to him, for 
the second another 12; and for t~e last, 8. 
Nm1, to :make no mystery of it, since you understand it so '\<Tell, 
and I only wish to see that I have made no mistake, the value (by 
which I mean only the value of the opponent's money) of the last game 
of two is double that of the last game of three and four times the 
lastgame of four and eight times the last game of five, etc.30 
i.e. for the case of a game to n ~·rhere A has n-1 wins and B zero, A should get 
1 - (i)n-l proportion of B's ante. 
The other case of A having n-1, B having 1 is not so easy. In the example 
of A having 2, B having 1, A is 0'\ITed ~=~:a of B Is share. Pascal then gener-
alizes this to the case of A having n-1, B having 1, saying that A is owed 
1. 3_0." 22n-l of B 1 s ante. His reasoning is: 1.3.5.. n 
In the fi~st place, it ~st be said that if one has gained 1 out 
of 5 games, for example, and if one needs 4, the match "t<ri.ll be decided 
for certain in 8 which is double 4. 
The value in terms of the opponent's stakes, of the first game 
in a set of 5, is a fraction whose numerator is half the combinations 
of 4 out of 8 (I take 4 because it is equal to the number of games 
required and 8 because it is double 4) and whose denominator is this 
same numerator plus all the combinations of higher numbers. 
Thus, if I have won the first game out of 5, 35/128 of my oppon-
ent's stake is due to me: that is to say, if he has staked 128 pis-
tales, I take 35 and leave him the remainder, 93. 
Now this fraction 35/128 is the same as 105/384 which is made 
by taking the product of even numbers as denominator and the product 
of odd numbers as numerator. 
You will undoubtedly understand all this well, if you take a 
little trouble: that is why I think it unnecessary to go on with it 
any .longer.31 
-19-
I.e. the fraetion ovred 
+ ( ~) + ( ~) + ( ~) + (1) 
and since 
(1 + 1)8 = (~) + (~) + • • • + (~) and (~) = (n~k) 
we have 
fraction owed: 
~(1 + 1)8 
8.7.6.5 1 7-5-3.1 
= 4.3.2.1 ~ = 8.6.4.2 
He gives no particular reasoning for the combinations used in the derivation, 
assuming that Fermat vrould understand. that the solution has 
of B's ante.32 Even with this slight error, this solution represents a major 
breakthrough in the theory of probability. This is the first time that anyone 
has ever solved the problem of points and in some generality. 
The reply of Fermat to Pascal has been lost. However, in Pascal's reply, 
he writes of the inapplicability of Fermat's combinatorial method to the problem 
involving three gamblers. From this we assume that in the last letter Fermat 
offered a combinatoric solution to the problem. Pascal incorrectly interprets 
the extension of Fermat's solution and shows how his ovm method gives the correct 
answer. In Fermat's reply he shows again that Pascal is in error and offers yet 
another method of solution, in which he gives the probability of A vrinning on 
each of one, two or three tosses, sums them up, and has the probability of A 
winning, once again demonstrating the additivity of probabilities '\'rhich Cardano 
had shovm 100 years before. Pascal in his return to Fermat says that he is glad 
that they are in complete agreement, but he doesn't '\'Tish to correspond on the 
subject any more. They had only one more exchange of letters in 1660 on unre-
lated subjects. In reading these last letters, and in some parts of the earlier 
-20-
letters, one gets the idea that Pascal may have been slightly intimidated by the 
. ;\. 
great genius of Fermat, and how easily he could come up with several methods of 
solution when Pascal spent so much effort on one, which would often have an 
error in it. Perhaps this was the reason he wi'shed to break off the correspon-
dence, or perhaps it was because of his religious feelings against science; 
but for whatever reason, here ends the recognized story of the invention of 
probability theory. 
Now making my own subjective analysis of why these men '\'Tere able to deduce 
what people ha.d wondered about for two centuries, it seems that the necessary 
ingredients consisted of a great genius who had done a little gambling, Pascal; 
a nobleman who had wondered about gamb.ling, de Mere, to motivate the problem; 
and a mathematician, perhaps the greatest who ever lived, Fermat, to get inter-
ested. Where most men would need a f.eel for gambling to know what the probabil-
ities ought to be and work from there, Fermat's genius was so great that he only 
needed to be motivated to look at the problem to solve it. One gets the idea 
that Pascal also felt this way from the tone of the letters. 
Conclusion 
We have thus traced the development of the theory of probability from 
antiquity until its official invention in 1654. Many reasons have been given 
as to why certain events happened and didn't happen when they did. The over-
riding conclusion is that basic probability theory came about as the merging 
of the idea of random phenomena (exemplified by gambling) with the exact science 
of mathematics. This apparent contradiction in terms is the reason why probabil-
i ty was so long in developing, and l-rhy it ultimately took men of such great 
genius to master it. 
... 2.1-
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